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Abstract: 
The culture of  economic colonization is at the background and yet at the 
center of  Arendt’s Human Condition. This colonizing culture is perfectly 
actualized through work and labor under a rhythmic coordination of  
a pater familias. It is more than ever enslaving and alienating, since it 
excludes possibilities for self-emancipation and provides no room for 
individuality. Work and labor therefore stand on the opposite side to 
the political. The culture they offer is in nature contradictory to the 
one promoted by the political. Hence the political is believed to be the 
remedy of  economic and political problems. It in essence promotes 
action, i.e., the culture necessary for human self-emancipation. Arendt’s 
position on the idea of  the political, however, must not be taken for 
granted. Arendt’s insistence on direct participation in political life has 
reminded us that citizens must be able to take care of  their own desires 
and interests. It would be naïve to uncritically entrust one’s destiny, life, 
and future to the political authority or to the state.
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Hannah Arendt (1906-1975) has been widely known as a political philosopher par excellence. Arendt’s critical analysis on the realm of  
political phenomenon and her emphasis on the significance of  a forum 
for human self-expression are relevant social and political issues to be 
aware of, since narrow understanding of  the political and the lost of  
the public space have been quite prevalent even in the so-called modern 
democratic societies. Indonesian political and economic turbulence which 
had taken place over ten years and various massive riots staged nationwide 
as the protest and rejection to the existing political and economic 
mismanagement, for instance, can be considered the best example that 
must awaken even every modern society to take seriously Arendt’s radical 
understanding of  the political. 
This essay focuses on giving some philosophical remarks on 
Arendt’s idea of  the human condition. Through this philosophical effort, I 
attempt to reveal as long as I can the richness of  the philosopher’s idea of  
the human condition. To a certain extent, this essay is aiming at unfolding 
the silent ideas of  Arendt’s Human Condition.1  It will be done by showing, 
first, the intrusion of  the private sphere (characterized by labor and work) 
and its implications on the public sphere (characterized by the absorption 
by the social) on  the one hand; and, second,  the political as the remedy 
and, at the same time, the realm of  human self-emancipation, on the 
other. Dwelling deeper the philosopher’s ideas, particularly, about work, 
labor, and action would be of  highly inspiring for even modern scieties to 
be aware of  the problem of  economic colonization over human beings.
It is worth noting that there might be different perspectives to 
read Arendt’s political philosophy. The problem, however, is not so much 
about the perspective one has to take in reading Arendt. Rather, whether 
the very perspective we choose is viable enough to bring us to a better 
understanding of  the philosopher’s position. Relying on this purpose, 
reading Arendt’s ideas of  work, labor, and action not as work, labor, and 
action as such but rather as a kind of  political culture, might help unfold 
political values she tried to defend in her major work The Human Condition.
The essay starts with a discussion on the philosopher’s idea of  
work and labor; followed then by a discernment of  the social as the 
antithesis of  both labor and work, on the one hand, and action, on the 
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other. And since economic and political difficulties arising due chiefly to 
the slave culture brought about by work and labor, this paper will be closed 
with a discussion about the idea of  polis as the remedy of  the problem. 
Arendt’s optimistic position on the political, however, must not be taken 
for granted. Economic colonization has been so pervasive that even the 
political is not immune of  the negative impacts prompted by economic 
interest.
    
Economic Enslavement
Arendt took the realm of  labor as human biological cycle. It is 
the realm that operates in a circle of  necessity merely for the sake of  
preserving human life. In such realm human beings are totally dictated 
by natural necessity for the fulfillment of  their daily life; they are entirely 
subject to the natural rhythm of  biological necessity. It is the manifestation 
of  family life and patriarchal relationship within which all members of  
the society and their activities are totally controlled by a figure of  father 
in the family. The presence of  a “father” is indispensable since laborers’ 
performance and the best result they may create depend very much on a 
rhythmic coordination of  all individual movements.2 The culture of  labor 
in essence nearly provides no room for self-expression or freedom. Labor 
in itself  is, therefore, nothing but the manifestation of  slave culture.3
It would be reasonable to say that in the realm of  labor there 
is a strong tendency to see people simply as a mass of  persons without 
self-identity. To put it in Marx’s mouth, in the realm of  labor people are 
alienated from both their work and themselves for they actually have no 
autonomy in producing things. Applying tools and machine to ease his 
work, human being is able to boost and increase his/her productivity. 
Hence, to a certain extent, the realm of  labor and the machines or the 
technology it adopts to ease the whole process of  production has brought 
with it material wealth. It eases and provides human being with more 
comfortable life to enjoy. In short, the quality of  human life in terms 
of  economy has increased due to the economic growth boosted by the 
technology. Unfortunately, the product he/she has fabricated, in fact, 
stands relatively independent from its creator.  Products are even stand 
against its creator because the creator, due to his/her voracious needs and 
wants, is now controlled by things he/she has produced. And once they 
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are totally subject to their life cycle necessity, they must be at the same 
time alienated from the circumstances they live in.4 In other words, human 
being is living in a repressive and totalitarian condition for he/she is not 
able to release him/herself  from economic enslavement.5  
Arendt step further to dismantle the core political problem 
culturally folded by labor.  She believed that human being is not only a homo 
laborans but also homo faber, which is characterized by the durability of  things 
he produces. Beside the realm of  labor, there is the realm of  work, within 
which homo faber as “the lord and master of  the whole earth” who under 
“the guidance of  a model” is able to produce things which “by definition 
bound to result in a Promothean revolt because it could erect a man-made 
world only after destroying part of  God-created nature”.6 Human being 
in the realm of  work, thus, demonstrates his strength and power over 
nature. Nature is now under the control of  human being. In this sense, 
Arendt tried to encourage even modern societies to realize the power of  
athropocentristic approach to nature. Arendt seemed to emphasize that 
nature has lost its value due to the colonization of  economic interest. Its 
value is rather determined by its functionality in serving and satisfying 
human desires and wants. Human being is no longer a part of  nature. 
He/she puts him/herself  above and beyond the nature. In such position 
human being is free to control and even to explore as much as possible the 
nature to fullfil his/her needs.
It is clear that the realm of  labor and that of  work are different 
to each other. The former is characterized by consumption, while the 
latter is identified by durability of  products. Yet, they have certain traits 
in common.  First, both of  them present an ethos of  relationship that 
provides no room for individuality. All people are treated merely as a 
mass of  society whose activities and way of  life are inevitably under the 
control an external power. Just like homo laborans, who is entirely subject 
to life’s necessity, homo faber in the whole process of  fabrication is entirely 
dictated by the model of  the produced-object as such that “what guides 
the work of  fabrication is outside the fabricator and precedes the actual 
work process in much the same way as the urgencies of  the life process 
within the laborer precede the actual process”.7
Second, both the realm of  labor and that of  work have developed 
as such that human being (the maker) can no longer put them under its 
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own control. In the realm of  labor, people might be so over abundant 
that they are unable to realize themselves from the enslavement dictated 
by their own life’s necessity. What Arendt worried most is that the never-
ending demand of  material happiness would push homo laborans to pursue 
more and more consumed-materials so that they are unable to release 
themselves from material enslavement. This uncontrolled-consumption 
tendency would even in turn put all objects of  the world in danger. There 
might be no object of  the world that really safe from annihilation through 
consumption. Forests devastation, uncontrolled explorations of  natural 
resources, biosphere quality degradation, the increase of  the earth’s 
temperature, or the environmental destruction in general, obviously 
exemplify the unintended implications of  uncontrolled appetite of  
consumption.
To such extent, Hanna Fenichel Pitkin is absolutely right when 
she wrote: “We are destroying species, exhausting resources, fouling the 
earth so that it may soon be unfit for inhabitation.”8 Thus, the point is not 
so much about human greed as such, but rather that his or her greed has 
become a kind of  civilization: consumerism. Living in such civilization 
would be easy for human being to see nature simply as means for the 
fulfillment of  his or her own needs. This attitude in turn would impose 
him or her to exploit nature, and so to do violence on nature, without 
having respect for it as something meaningful in itself. 
Thus in the realm of  work and in the never-ending process of  
fabrication, people’s way of  thinking and behaving is in essence shaped 
by means-end approach. In such approach, every product or object of  
production is considered the new means for a new end. A table is, therefore, 
a product that comes to existence by a machine designed to produce it. 
A table, however, in the means-end way of  thinking, is nothing but a 
means by which homo faber is able to gain, say, money as a new end. This 
process and approach will continue as such that human beings are trapped 
in a never-ending chain of  means and ends. Following Kant, it must be 
admitted that, in such process, there is nothing considered meaningful in 
itself. The principle of  “usefulness” has replaced and even given priority 
over the principle of  “meaningfulness”. The so-called meaning has been 
alien to Homo faber. The meaningfulness of  the world is “beyond the reach 
of  homo faber”.9
Andre Ata Ujan: Living under Economic Colonization
126
MELINTAS 29.2.2013
Moreover, the implication of  the means-end approach in the 
whole process of  production has no less malicious impact on human 
relationship than that which has appeared in the realm of  labor. The 
means-end approach has led people in authority to see all workers merely 
as means of  production. A human being is therefore no longer viewed as, 
borrowing Kant, an end in him or herself  since his or her meaningfulness 
is entirely dependent on his or her usefulness in the whole process of  
production. In short, all things, within the realm of  work, are at risk of  
losing their intrinsic value. Using Kant’s way of  thinking and following 
Marx in Das Kapital, Arendt emphasized that man as homo faber tends to 
capitalize and force everything to be the object of  fabrication. Even the 
earth in general and all forces of  nature which by nature independent of  
human world are subject to change as the will of  man requires it.10
The above emphasis unfolds another serious ethical problem 
regarding the quality of  the biosphere within which human beings reside 
and spend their lives. Homo faber and the culture of  instrumentation it 
carries out has provoked another challenging problem that might risk the 
quality of  human life. The problem is that within a culture of  means-end 
relationship man has positioned himself  as central point or the measure 
of  all things in the world. Such culture has stipulated the existence of  a 
naïve anthropocentrism—i.e., an absurd opinion that takes man as the 
highest being and hence everything else must be subject to the exigencies 
of  human life. This way of  thinking has indeed put everything in the 
world in a vulnerable position. It reflects human arrogant domination over 
the rest of  creatures. Means-end relationship developed by homo faber has 
anihilated things’ intrinsic value and treated them simply as means for the 
satisfaction of  human needs. Thus, the culture of  means-end relationship 
is basically a vulgar demonstration of  human beings’ domination over 
nature at large. The problem, therefore, “is not so much whether we are 
the masters or the slaves of  our machines, but whether machines still serve 
the world and its things, or if, on the contrary, they and the automatic 
motion of  their processes have begun to rule and even destroy world and 
things”.11
Arendt’s profound concern on the machines’ destructive capacity 
is absolutely reasonable. Human beings’ desire to increase the quality of  
their products, as the indispensable requirement of  market competition, 
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would continuously encourage them to increase the efficiency of  the 
machines they use to produce. In other words, technology must be more 
and more efficient in order to support and even to win the market. But, it 
is the nature of  technology that the more efficient it is, the more powerful 
and so the more destructive it could be. Thus, human beings are able 
to benefit from technology; they, however, at the same time, are actually 
threatened by the destructive power of  the technology.
The implication of  technology on human civilization is, therefore, 
actually crucial to be aware of. Technology and its power to produce things 
have commonly recognized as unavoidable part of  human life. Technology 
has gigantic power to make everything available to use. Technology can 
even become so powerful that it can create not only things to meet human 
needs, but also human desire itself.  Herbert Marcuse, (1898-1979), at this 
point must be right when he, in his One Dimensional Man, (1964), stated that 
it is not we but technology that determines our needs of  things. Marcuse 
as such is saying that we are no longer the master of  our own desire. 
Technology creates our desire and wants. We are unconsciously subject 
to the spirit of  consumerism that inevitably imposed on by technology. 
And when technology turns out to be the determinant and creator of  our 
desire, its development and the destructive power it entails would be really 
out of  our capacity to control. Technology and the products it fabricated 
has become so repressive and even totalitarian that human beings are 
put entirely under its control and strictly directed them to see economic 
satisfaction as the only human goal.12 To such extent, technology and the 
products it fabricates has reduced human being to be homo economicus.
Under the repressive control of  economy, a product as an object, 
which has been created by man is even separated from the subject as 
its creator for it now puts human being in a never ending temptation to 
produce and to consume. The object has turned out to be a new threat of  
the subject. Thus, human being, by using technology, is able to demonstrate 
his or her domination over nature; but technology, to a certain extent, 
can turn out to be harmful to human being itself; that is, its expansion 
has developed so excessively that human being can no longer be able to 
release him/herself  from its repressive domination.
The use of  technology has in fact transformed human relationship 
into a means-end relationship, a relationship in which people see each 
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other as a means rather than as a person who has intrinsic value in his/
herself. Thus, in the realm of  labor, people are working together but 
they actually never enjoy the beauty of  being together. Labor therefore 
has become the cultural handicap for people to get into, following Carol 
Gilligan, “relational” sphere13, a condition within which an individual is 
able to grow up to be a person in the fullest sense of  the word.  To be 
a person in the true sense of  the word, presumes very much freedom to 
choose and to act. But the problem is that under the domination of  a 
patriarchal culture and the enslavement of  economic necessity, people are 
conditioned in such a fashion that they do not even realize the economic 
enslavement they are suffering of.
 
The Absorption of  the Social
The above discussion has revealed a paradoxical progress 
that human beings have achieved as one of  the consequences of  the 
development of  both economy and technology they have created. On 
the one hand, it must be admitted that we, the modern people, have 
demonstrated an astonishing achievement in producing things, even the 
things that, as described by Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, people of  “earlier 
centuries only dreamed, things they used to exemplify the humanly 
impossible (flying to the moon, say), things of  which they did not even 
dream.”14 However, such powerful capacities that have enabled human 
beings to enjoy extraordinary achievements in almost all aspects of  their 
life, on the other hand, cannot make people happy or even powerful. Since 
economic resources are not fairly accessible to all people, economic benefits 
and power are mostly confined to a very small number of  people. But the 
most tragic thing is that even those who benefit do not really control the 
products they have produced. They are enslaved by the products they have 
created. They are dictated to use the product to produce more and more 
things to the point that they can no longer enjoy the real benefit of  the 
product. What they achieve through this never ending lust of  producing 
is nothing but the marginal advantage of  the products. To such extent, 
producers are, to use Karl Marx’s words, alienated from their products.15 
This is the logical consequence of  the means-end culture that commonly 
grows and characterizes every modern capitalist society.                                     
Thus, again, we are now facing a paradoxical condition concerning 
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our own capacity to create. Living in a culture of  means-end relationship, 
we, on the one hand, glorify our power and domination over the world; 
and yet, on the other hand, the progress we have achieved turns out to be 
an indispensable threat to our humanity at the moment its development 
and the consequences it has brought about are really out of  our capacity 
to control. In short, we are now experiencing a collective powerless at 
the moment we are unfortunately entrapped by our own activities and 
enslaved by our own products.
Such phenomenon is the signal and, at the same time, the character 
of  what Arendt terms as “the social.” What is that? In The Human Condition 
Arendt interchangeably used “the society” and “the social” without 
providing her readers with a clear distinction between these two terms. 
She even some time called it “the social realm” or “the social sphere” as 
if  to say that the term has entailed a nuance of  culture or civilization that 
specifically characterizes human relationship within certain period of  their 
life progress.
Arendt devoted in her The Human Condition a long account of  the 
topic under the title “The Rise of  The Social”.  The social refers to the 
rise of  a society which in essence fails to put a distinct borderline between 
the private and the political.  It opens the door for intervention of  the 
private to the political in a fashion that changes the meaning and even 
the significance of  the terms  for human beings as both the individual 
and the citizen.16 The society or the social, therefore, has become a threat 
to human life. Arendt as such went through the line with Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau to hold dear that “the social”, as a modern phenomenon, has 
its main basis in the transformation of  the private life into the public 
life which is driven by the emergence of  the society. Rousseau in his A 
Discourse On the Origin of  Inequality, in contrast to Hobbes, explained that 
human beings in the state of  nature had lived a harmonious and happy 
life, even a harmonious relationship with animals. In the state of  nature, 
man even enjoys so healthy and convenient life that he “has no need of  
remedies, and still less of  physicians”.17   Living in such situation, the 
savage is not really challenged with the problem of  how to live or how to 
enjoy a better life. 
The state of  nature enjoyed by the savages is possible because 
they undertake and confine themselves only on what they really need. In 
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other words, they just undertake what the nature allows them to do. The 
savages realizes that human beings have the right to make use and to get 
the benefit from the nature they live in, but it must be balanced with a 
natural duty to maintain and to take care of  it. In so doing, the savages 
also give the opportunity even to the next generation to enjoy the same 
natural benefit. Such condition, however, has changed when the savage 
“becomes sociable and a slave”. Living in a society has changed his way 
of  life and this situation has made him “grows weak, timid, and servile; 
his effeminate way of  life totally enervates his strength and courage.”18 
He can no longer enjoy a mutual relationship that, based on the common 
awareness of  equality among all members of  the family, enables him to 
benefit from it without, at the same time, disadvantaging others.19 
In the same line of  argument Arendt came to hold that it is the 
social that has caused the emergence of  inhuman relationship. Arendt 
believed that conflicts, which are taking place in our modern society, are 
just the indispensable consequence of  the rise of  the social “for society 
always demands that its members act as though they were members of  
one enormous family which has only one opinion and one interest”.20 
Thus, there is no space for freedom and self-expression in true sense of  
the words. In the other words, the rise of  the social is but the emergence 
of  the household (oikia) and its activities in the public realm which has 
distort the public realm in such a way that it can no longger fit for human 
beings both as individuals and citizens to live a descent life. At this level, 
the social is no longer the opposite side of  the private but of  the political; 
or, the social is the non-political sphere which is circumscribed by private 
sphere in the ancient traditional understanding of  the term. The social 
is the hallmark of  the non-political communities in which the agora is 
not the meeting place for free citizens to discuss common good issues, 
but rather the place wherein everyone could exhibit and exchange their 
products. Thus, agora has become the arena of  free competition merely 
for the sake of  economic interest.21 Politics, at this point, as properly put 
by Pitkin, would change to be the source that supplies “the collective body 
with a head to reassert human direction of  its biological processes, of  
the socioeconomic forces generated by large numbers of  interdependent 
people making their livings.”22
The main point to underscore is that the transformation of  the 
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private or oikia into the public has brought with it the transformation of  
the culture within the realm of  the public. Operating within the household 
civilization, the public is now entirely subject to the domination of  pater 
familias who nearly never allows any space for freedom and self-identity. 
Hence, the rise of  the social has promoted in the public realm not only 
the uncontrolled development of  economy, but also a mode of  power 
centralization in terms of  both economics and politics. Its corollary is 
terrible: a huge and gigantic centralization of  power. This centralized 
and complex power, according to Arendt, has been well manifested in 
the form of  complicated political bureaucracy. This is a “monster” that 
ready to impose its own rule and create an alien interdependence under 
the control of  an unidentified power.23
Arendt must be right. The emergence of  complicated bureaucracy 
commonly characterizing the governments of  so many (developing) 
countries is the best justification of  Arendt’s theory. Arendt unmasked our 
inability to keep the distance between the private sphere and the political 
sphere and this would result in the emergence of  authoritarianism and 
absolutism. “No-man rule” is the best terminology that properly describes 
such complicated bureaucracy. This is a terrible political atmosphere since 
“the rule by nobody is not necessarily no-rule; it may indeed, under certain 
circumstances, even turn out to be one of  its cruelest and most tyrannical 
version.”24
 Thus, Arendt was inclined to remind us that the state must not be 
treated in the way we treat a family. The state is a public entity. It operates 
in its own sphere and under the control of  its own rule and regulation. 
So does a family; it is a private entity which operates in accordance with 
the natural necessity under the direction of  a familial head. They cannot 
be treated in the same way and with the same attitude. So, we have to be 
careful of, for instance, Rousseau’s idea that tends to see the family as the 
first model of  political society. Rousseau, however, seems to realize the 
unintended consequences of  such a notion so he felt necessary to add: 
“and all, being born free and equal, surrender their freedom only when 
they see advantage in doing so”.25
This careful formulation, however, must not make us be blind 
of  its potential malicious consequences on human life, for once the 
distinction between the two is blurred or even eliminated, then, social 
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problems would come in return. Social, economic, and political crisis which 
had been suffered by Indonesia in the last decade, started with the “1997 
economic and political turbulence”, for instance, is the best example of  
negative effect brought about by the intrusion of  private sphere upon the 
public sphere wherein the state is governed and treated as a big family. Its 
effect on social, economic, and political life is highly terrible. Hegemony 
of  power--in terms of  economy and politics--and monopoly of  truth by 
political authority had come to the fore as the main atmosphere of  familial 
state. All these have happened precisely because the ruler, by figuring 
himself  as a father of  a big family, was able to escape all kinds of  public 
control.
In such a situation, all economic advantages were going into the 
regime’s and its cronies’ pockets. Campus and its academic activities were 
put under the strict control of  the government. Freedom of  expression 
and assembly, freedom of  press and citizens’ right to political participation 
in general were amputated. Bureaucracy had been growing up to such a 
fashion that public accountability had become impossible thing to require.
Those phenomena have become indications revealing that the 
state, in the spirit of  a big family, is governed by a ruler whose very words 
are by themselves laws for all citizens. In short, when the state is treated 
as “national household”, then, the public sphere is absorbed by the social. 
Or, once citizens’ daily affairs are entirely controlled by, in Arendt’s words, 
a “nation-wide administration housekeeping”, social miseries would exist 
as its inevitable consequence. So, social disaster suffered by Indonesia in 
last period of  the Orde Baru regime, is the consequence of  the ruler’s 
inability to prevent the private household civilization from its penetration 
into or intrusion upon the public realm. The 1998 Reformation Movement, 
promoted by Indonesian students nationwide, and the extensive awakening 
of  common awareness in insisting the public space for the exercise of  
citizens’ basic freedom and rights, ethnic rebellions and separatism 
movements in Aceh (North Sumatra), Moluccas, and Papua island, “only 
indicate that the various social groups have suffered the same absorption 
into one society that the family unit had suffered earlier”.26
In the realm of  the social, where overlapping between private 
sector and public sector have become so coagulating, a ruler would prefer 
to consider the enforcement of  rule and law as the only possible way to 
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maintain social order and, at the same time, securely preserve his power. 
In this way, society is able to “normalize” its members and able to take 
control over them. This treatment, however, has eliminated, borrowing 
Rousseau, “compassion” as the most basic virtue in human private life. In 
society, human relationship, said Rousseau, is no longer directed by natural 
compassion, but by “morality and rule of  laws” which are arranged or 
set up by society as the new norms for social interactions between its 
members. Thus morality and rule of  laws are the normative apparatuses 
serving to prevent people from doing bad or injustice in accordance with 
the will of  the authoritarian ruler who takes control over citizens just 
like the “pater familias, the dominus, ruled over his household of  slaves and 
family”.27
Rousseau, however, does not believe that morality and rule of  laws 
can effectively function to prevent people from doing bad or committing 
injustice. He on the contrary held that people are not bad because they 
naturally live their life in the “peacefulness of  their passion”. To him, 
compassion is a “natural feeling, which, by moderating the activity of  love 
of  self  in each individual, contributes to the preservation of  the whole 
species”. Such peacefulness, however, has lost when the state of  nature is 
eliminated and replaced by society or by the state of  reason.28
Thus the point is that the emergence of  society or the rise of  
the social has caused a chaotic sphere because of  the confusion between 
the intimate private household and the public realm, which by nature are 
sharply different from one another. That is why Pitkin, describing Arendt’s 
basic stance on this matter, said: “Relating the social to family…seems to 
imply an unhealthy expansion of  private into public life.”29 This reveals 
that Arendt had shared the same position with Rousseau in ascribing 
social disorder and miseries to the elimination of  the privacy due chiefly 
to the rise of  the social. The privacy, therefore, is not the opposite side 
of  the political but that of  the social. Arendt even sees the political as the 
remedy of  social miseries caused by the social, for she believes that only 
in the political can freedom and individuality take place.
A Need for self-emancipation  
Arendt demonstrated here one of  the main problems commonly 
faced by authoritarian societies. She tried to attract our attention to be 
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aware of  the elimination of  freedom and individuality from true political 
civilization due to the penetration of  non-political civilization into the 
political. It must be acknowledged that work and labor, to a certain extent, 
are humanizing. Human beings cannot live without work and labor. “But 
work and labor also have their harsh, even alienating, aspects”.30 Politically 
speaking, citizens’ rights to political participation have been annihilated 
even as the unintended implication of  the politic of  domination 
represented in the form of  the social. The political is therefore imposed 
to adopt and operate within a culture that by nature is alien, even harmful, 
to the political itself.
To simplify, what is decisive about society or the social is that it 
“excludes the possibility of  action”31 and, instead, imposes a culture of  
“conformism”. It is on this problem that Arendt focused her philosophical 
analysis and recommended the political as its remedy. Her recommendation 
was based on the belief, which she actually shared with the Greek tradition, 
that living a social live is the way that leads human beings to their truly 
human life. To be truly human, human beings need mutual recognition 
and this can be reached only in being with others.32
Arendt as such reemphasized Greek’s traditional belief  of  the 
importance of  a polis33 and clear distinction between private sphere and 
public sphere, between the sphere of  household and that of  polis. It 
stands in contrast to the slave culture promoted by labor and work. A 
polis in Greek tradition is, borrowing Seyla Benhabib, a “agonistic political 
space”34 within which people—except women, slaves, children, laborers, 
and non-citizens—are able to express and demonstrate their greatness 
and, at the same time, execute their rights to participate in political life. 
In Arendt’s words, polis is the realm of  action. It provides rooms for 
everyone to express him or herself. It promotes opportunity for everyone 
to talk to each other. It is a public realm which is strictly differentiated 
from private realm because its aim is not simply for the good life as that in 
the sphere of  the household. It is the only place within which “men could 
show who they really and inexchangeably were”.35 Polis is therefore the 
arena in which “one competes for recognition, precedence, and acclaim”. 
For the Greeks, polis is the respublica in the Romans tradition.36 Thus, all 
people who are excluded from the polis are considered slaves or barbarians, 
the people who are not really human being.
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Although putting a great admiration of  Greek’s idea of  polis, Arendt 
is not simply a nostalgic thinker. Her critical exploration of  the realm 
of  labor, work, and action definitely demonstrates Arendt’s thoroughly 
discernment and careful diagnosis and explanation of  political dilemmas 
in the modern societies. Her basic position in viewing social dilemmas as 
the consequence of  the substitution of  making (the culture of  labor and 
work) for action (the culture of  action in polis) is an invention. Arendt 
provided a new perspective to read and to understand better the idea of  
polis. It must even be acknowledged that Arendt, inspired by Greek’s polis, 
was successful to introduce a radical understanding of  the political.
Politic for Arendt is no longer relevant to be conceived of  in a 
conventional way and attached exclusively to the government and those 
who are directly involved in it. Rather, following Greek’s traditional 
concept of  polis, the political is a way of  life which is fundamentally 
characterized by action and actualized through citizens’ free participation 
in political life. Politic as such is no longer an exclusive business of  those 
in the government. Rather, it has become the arena or agora accessible 
to everyone within which—at this point Arendt’s position is different 
from the traditional understanding of  polis—all people can freely compete 
to each other as the process towards the articulation and formulation 
of  their common good. The political is, therefore, an arena of  public 
meeting for consensus building. So, “to be political, to live in a polis”, 
emphasized Arendt, “meant that everything was decided through words 
and persuasion and not through forced deliberation. Arendt emphasized 
here the centrality of  reason in every conflict resolution process.37 It is 
important to give priority to the unforced force of  reason, that is, the 
way of  deliberation in which arguments play a very central role in the 
whole process of  decision making and consensus building.  That is why 
Aristotle’s idea of  zoon politikon38, according to Arendt, “can be better 
understood in pair with his idea of  man as a zoon logon ekhon (a living being 
capable of  speech)”.39
Arendt’s defense on the centrality of  action is reasonable. Through 
action human being reveals or discloses him/herself. The act of  revealing 
and disclosing in itself, at the same time, presumes the presence of  others 
or togetherness. To say that we are disclosing ourselves without the 
presence of  others would be absurd. An individual is not able disclose 
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him or herself  in isolation. In other words, speech and action always take 
place in plurality. Human plurality is, therefore, the basic condition for 
speech and action. Yet, it would be true likewise to say that speech and 
action have become so significant in human life precisely because we are 
living in a pluralistic society.40 
A pluralistic society requires all members of  society to share the 
same and fair access into public affairs. In a pluralistic society, the so-called 
“public affairs” or “common good” can no longer be entirely entrusted 
to the ones in authority. This is however not to say that those in authority 
are not worthy of  public trust. Rather that polis or a republic would grow 
stronger and greater under strong and genuine supports of  its citizens 
who are in fact pluralistic.41
The problem is that authoritarian rulers tend to overlook plurality 
and diversity and so banish the public realm within which plurality and 
diversity take place. They tend to view themselves as the only legitimate 
persons eligible for public positions and authority. They fail to realize that 
in so doing, they actually pave the way for the social, that is, the pre-political 
culture, to reign. At this point, the pre-political culture penetrates into the 
political and violence would come to take place because the culture of  
domination, operating in pre-political societies, is by nature contradictory 
to the culture of  freedom and action growing up in political societies.
Every great and civilized society is therefore must be very careful of  
the ideology of  “general will”. In reality, every authoritarian regime tends 
to see the idea of  general will as the most effective ideological instrument 
to promote his/her own interest. It is in fact used simply as the means 
by which citizens’ basic rights, particularly citizens’ right to freedom, are 
confined and, at the same time, the regime’s interest is selfishly promoted. 
Once freedom is amputated, the value of  humanity would be in trouble.42 
It is true that through an open interaction among citizens as free 
and equal persons, they might find themselves to be truly human beings. 
They can even realize that only through a free and open interaction can 
they come to a real progress. Public realm is therefore of  highly important 
element in the political.  Or as Machiavelli put it: “…public life depends 
on a living structure of  relationships among citizens, relationships that 
extend beyond the personal and face-to-face to the impersonal, large-
scale, and remote”.43
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Some Critical Remarks 
Arendt’s idea of  the political as the realm of  excellence, however, 
must not be taken for granted. It is too optimistic to identify the political 
entirely as the realm of  free exchange of  ideas and social interaction. Real 
and common experience tells us the opposite. More often the political is 
used to support the dominant parties or the ruling class’ egoistic interests. 
The phenomenon of  the so-called transactional politics has become so 
popular that even the ordinary people are so familiar with the terminology. 
Transactional politics is nothing but the commoditization of  the political 
due to the domination of  economic interest. Hans George Gadamer would 
be right as he pointed out that everything is interest. And one of  the most 
stipulating interests (beside woman and power) is economic interest. The 
political actually has been influenced and even colonized by economic 
interest. The domination of  economy over the political has blurred the 
culture of  speech and action in such a fashion that freedom and excellence 
as the characteristic of  the political tend to be eliminated.
Karl Marx’s criticism of  capitalism is, therefore, still valid.44 Marx 
is quite right as he identified the domination of  the infrastructure, i.e., 
economy, over the superstructure, i.e., politics, philosophy, law, and even 
religion. Whereas Karl Popper’s defense of  capitalism based on his belief  
that young capitalism—that is, exploitative capitalism—has died must be 
wrong.45 Consumerism and economic greediness followed by massive 
corruption have become the blatant evidences of  the colonization of  
economy over the modern societies. Even economic turbulences are the 
logical consequence of  the economic colonization over human beings. 
Arendt, therefore, fails to realize that even the political in reality is not 
entirely free even from the domination of  life necessity. Speech and 
action as the reflection of  freedom has been so distorted by economic 
interest that the political can no longer become the open arena for self-
actualization in the true sense of  the word.
Negative impacts of  economic colonization are too real and obvious 
to neglect. Common experience tells us that more and more disadvantaged 
people are marginalized. Access to economic opportunities is so limited 
that the disadvantaged ones can no longer have real opportunity to enjoy 
a descent life. Chasm between the rich and the poor has increased to the 
point that the number of  the poor has growing remarkably even in the 
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societies that claim themselves modern societies.
To keep the political to be the arena for self-expression, or the 
domain of  excellence, is therefore one of  the real challenges that must 
be faced prudently and intelligently by modern societies. Three things 
can be considred important to maintain the political as the domain of  
excellence. First, we need a ruler who has no interest to be a ruler. He/she 
becomes a ruler simply because citizens want and fully support him/her to 
be their ruler. And he/she is supported to be a ruler because they find him 
share a genuine compassion and caring for the good of  others (that is, for 
citicnes as a whole).  Second, economy must be turned back to its original 
position as an embedded economy.46 The colonization of  economy (i.e. 
the domination of  work and labor) over the political is the reflection 
of  human inability to release his/herself  from economic greediness. 
Economic value is even put beyond human social relationship and, hence, 
eradicated from its role as the instrument of  social cohesion. Economy 
has become disembedded economy and even overvalued beyond any other 
social values, including political values. To minimize the domination of  
economy over the political is, therefore, necessary to do. This can be done 
by turning back economy to its original position in which it serves as a 
value among many other values that plays the very central role to promote 
human welfare at large. Economy is not the end in itself; it is, rather, an 
instrument by which human beings get into a free interaction between 
both themselves and human beings and the environment around them. 
In short, to save the political as the domain of  excellence, it is necessary 
that economy must be an embedded economy. This requires the shift of  
economical paradigm, that is, the shift from gain-oriented economy to 
human welfare-oriented economy; from formal or calculative economy 
to substantive economy. But economy can contribute to social welfare 
only, if  there is a shared culture in society to recognize and to treat private 
property as an entity which by nature is trans-individual.47
Third, it is necessary that the political must be strongly supported 
by fair constitution and consistent law enforcement. Massive corruption, 
transactional politics, political hegemony, civil illegal and immoral 
disobedience, and abuse of  power which in turn distort the political as 
the domain of  excellence is the logical consequences of  government’s 
inability to fairly and responsibly enforce the rule of  law.  A lawful society, 
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identified civil obedience to the rule of  law and consistent enforcement 
of  the rule of  law, are therefore a sine qua non condition for the existence of  
the political as the realm of  excellence. It is a society, in which everyone’s 
rights and obligations are fairly observed and protected. Without real 
support of  a lawful society, the existence of  the political as the realm of  
excellence would be a utopia.
Closing Remarks
It would be reasonable now to say that a healthy and strong 
political society is the one that provides, as much as possible, its citizens 
with opportunity to freely actualize themselves as both human being 
and legitimate member of  a political community. Right to economic and 
political participation would be essential to observe since it is the condition 
necessary to live a decent life as both an individual and citizen.
However, it must be kept in mind that uncontrolled economic 
drive can lead human beings to a never-ending struggle for economic 
interest. This condition would simply pave the way for human beings to 
be enslaved and live their life under the colonization of  economy.  Such 
condition would become worse as even the political, i.e., the realm of  
action, can no longer be free from economic enslavement. 
Keeping the political fairly free from economic enslavement is 
the sine qua non condition for all free and great societies, since only in such 
condition can every citizen have fair and equal opportunity to participate 
and to enjoy economic and political benefits. Hence, transactional politics 
driven by economic interest must be eliminated, on the one hand, and 
every citizen’s right to economic and political participation, on the other, 
must be protected and fairly accommodated.
Thus, the principle of  right must be taken as the fundamental 
guiding principle of  political and economic activities. In other words, 
political and economic activities are tolerable only insofar as everyone’s 
political and economic rights are secure. But, more than that, all political 
and economic access to political and economic participation would be 
justified, if  common good is taken to be chief  goal of  such activities. All 
political and economic activities must, therefore, promote mutual benefit 
among citizens as a whole. To use Polanyi words, disembeded economy 
must be turned to be embebed economy.
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It is in such background that Arendt’s concept of  the political 
be more relevant and significant to observe. Arendt’s insistence on direct 
participation in political life has reminded us that citizens must be able 
to take care of  their own desires and interests. It would be naïve to 
uncritically entrust one’s destiny, life, and future to political authority or 
to the state. The rationale of  such position would be very simple. Citizens 
know better the real live they live in. Citizens are even more prudent, 
asserts Machiavelli, for there are many heads ready to think and to judge 
in accordance with the real interests they have. But to make sure that every 
citizen’s right is secure, two conditions must be observed: first, there must 
be a shared culture of  taking property right as a trans-individual right; and 
second, building up a lawful society to make sure that everyone’s rights are 
fairly protected and accommodated. 
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